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Of Courts and Rights: Constitutionalism
in Post-Communist Albania
I. Introduction
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Empire
have radically transformed the constitutional order of Eastern
European countries and the former Soviet republics.' Democratic
systems of government and respect for individual rights have
replaced dictatorship and oppression. As a result, a flurry of
drafting efforts during the last decade has brought into being a
number of new constitutions, which drastically change the
relationship between the people and the state.2 In a well-attended
See, e.g., BELR. CONST., translated in 2 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD I (Gisbert H. Franz ed. & Inter-University Associates, Inc. trans., 1997)
(adopted Mar. 15, 1994; amended Nov. 27, 1996); BULG. CONST., translated in 3
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 87 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H.
Franz eds. & Ivan Sipkov trans., 1992) (adopted July 12, 1991); CZECH REP. CONST.,
translated in 5 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 117 (Albert P.
Blaustein & Gisbert H. Franz eds. & Gisbert H. Franz trans., 1993) (adopted Dec. 16,
1992); EST. CONST., translated in 6 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 3
(Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Franz eds., 1994) (adopted July 3, 1992); HUNG.
CONST., translated in 8 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD I (Gisbert H.
Franz ed. & Sdndor Gallai trans., 1995) (amended several times between 1989 and
1991); KAz. CONST., translated in 9 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 3
(Gisbert H. Franz ed. & Karin Hermanska trans., 1999) (adopted Jan. 28, 1993); KYRG.
CONST., translated in 10 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 95 (Gisbert
H. Franz ed. & Karin Hermanska trans., 1999) (adopted May 5, 1993); LITH. CONST.,
translated in 11 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD I (Albert P. Blaustein
& Gisbert H. Franz eds., 1994) (adopted Oct. 25, 1992); POL. CONST., translated in 15
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1 (Gisbert H. Franz ed. & Inter-
University Associates, Inc. trans., 1997) (adopted Apr. 2, 1997); RoM. CONST.,
translated in 15 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 5 (Albert P. Blaustein
& Gisbert H. Franz eds., 1992) (adopted Nov. 21, 1991); Russ. FED. CONST., translated
in 15 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert
H. Franz eds. & Federal News Service trans., 1994) (adopted Dec. 12, 1993); SLOVK.
CONST., translated in 16 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 63 (Albert P.
Blaustein & Gisbert H. Franz eds. & Peter Bajcik & Tibor Szerzodi trans., 1993)
(adopted Sept. 1, 1992).
2 The rise in importance of the idea of popular sovereignty may be observed in the
increased number of constitutions beginning with "We, the people" or similar language.
See, e.g., BELR. CONST., translated in 2 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
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referendum held in November 1998, the Albanian people joined
the rest of Eastern Europe in establishing for themselves a
democratic constitution.'
The purpose of this Comment is to describe and evaluate two
important parts of the Albanian Constitution of 1998: the
Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms and the Constitutional
Court. This Comment first provides a historical perspective by
outlining the status of individual rights under the Communist
Constitution of 1976.' It then explains in detail the rights and
freedoms established by the current Constitution.5 The Comment
turns next to the institutional structure, which protects both the
constitutional order and individual rights, and examines how the
Constitutional Court carries out its functions.6 The Comment
concludes with a few observations about issues that remain
unanswered by the text of the Constitution.7
II. The Constitution of 1976
The 1976 Constitution was praised as reflecting Albania's
progress along the Marxist materialist dialectic continuum and
marked her entrance into a new phase of socialist development.8 It
WORLD, supra note 1, at I ("We, the People of the Republic of Belarus"); CZECH REP.
CONST., translated in 5 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 1,
at 117 ("We, the citizens of the Czech Republic"); EST. CONST., translated in 6
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 1, at 3 ("the Estonian
people"); KAz. CONST., translated in 9 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD, supra note 1, at 3 ("We, the People of the Kazakhstan"); KYRG. CONST.,
translated in 10 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 1, at 95
("We, People of the Kyrgyz Republic"); LITH. CONST., translated in 11 CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 1, at 1 ("The Lithuanian Nation"); POL.
CONST., translated in 15 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note
1, at I ("we, the Polish Nation"); Russ. FED. CONST., translated in 15 CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 1, at I ("We, the multinational people of the
Russian Federation"); SLOVK. CONST., translated in 16 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 1, at 65 ("We, the Slovak nation").
' See Constitution Watch, A Country-by-Country Update on Constitutional
Politics in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR: Albania, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Fall 1998,
at 2, 2 [hereinafter Constitution Watch].
4 See infra notes 8-53 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 62-181 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 182-201, 215-55 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 202-14, 256-60 and accompanying text.
8 See ALB. CONST. of 1976, introduction, translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: HISTORIC CONSTITUTIONS 2 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H.
486 [Vol. 25
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established "a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat" that
expressed and defended "the interests of all the working people."9
The People's Socialist Republic was "based on the unity of the
people round the Party of Labour of Albania" and had as its
foundation "the alliance of the working class with the
cooperativist peasantry under the leadership of the working
class."' All state power within this structure emanated from the
working people and belonged to them."
The 1976 Constitution drew ideas and principles from both the
Constitution of the Soviet Socialist Republic of 1936 and the
Constitution of the People's Republic of China of 1954.2
Especially with respect to the Fundamental Rights and Duties of
Citizens, 3 the 1976 Constitution continued in the tradition of
socialist constitutions. It contained a lengthy list 14 of fundamental
rights, which, as one scholar commenting on socialist constitutions
has noted, was designed "[t]o demonstrate the superiority of
socialist democracy over bourgeois democracy."'5 All citizens, for
example, were equal before the law, and no restriction or privilege
was recognized on the basis of sex, race, nationality, social
Franz eds., 1981) ("Albania has entered the stage of the complete construction of
socialist society. The great historic changes have created new conditions for the
continuous development of the revolution and socialist construction."); see also William
B. Simons, Albania: Introduction, in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD 2,
4 (William B. Simons ed., 1980) (describing the Constitution of 1976); cf U.S.S.R.
CONST. of 1977, preamble, reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD,
supra, at 351, 352-54 (declaring the progress made in the U.S.S.R. under Communist
leadership); P.R.C. CONST. of 1978, preamble, reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COMMUNIST WORLD, supra, at 76, 76-78 (making similar claims).
9 ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 2.
10 Id.
I See ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 5.
12 For example, many of the fundamental rights and duties of citizens resemble
provisions of the Soviet Constitution, while the preamble is drafted in language similar
to that of the Chinese Constitution. Compare ALB. CONST. of 1976 with U.S.S.R.
CONST. of 1936, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY-STATES 37 (Jan
F. Triska ed., 1968) and P.R.C. CONST. of 1954, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY-STATES, supra, at 108.
13 See ALB. CONST. of 1976, arts. 38-65.
14 See id.
15 Chris Osakwe, The Common Law of Constitutions of the Communist-Party
States, 3 REV. SOCIALIST L. 155, 190 (1977).
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position, or material situation. 6 Women, "as a great force of the
revolution," enjoyed equal rights with men at work, in financial
compensation, and in the family.'7 National minorities were also
assured protection of their cultures and popular traditions,'8 while
mothers and children enjoyed "special solicitude and protection."' 9
The Constitution also protected the inviolability of the person
20
and the home,2 ' as well as the secrecy of correspondence.22
As a further showing of superiority over capitalist doctrine,
fundamental rights included a number of provisions regarding
social, economic, and cultural rights.23 Citizens enjoyed the right
to work, "which [was] guaranteed by the state,, 24 as well as the
"right of rest after work.' 25  They also enjoyed the "right to
education' 6 and were "guarantee[d] the freedom of scientific work
and literary and artistic creativeness., 27 All citizens had a right to
obtain "necessary medical services .. .free of charge," '28 and
workers were also entitled to "the necessary material means of
livelihood in old age, and in case of illness or loss of ability to
work.,
29
Typical of a socialist constitution, the Constitution of 1976
considered rights and duties to be closely intertwined. ° Such
16 ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 40.
'7 ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 41.
1 See ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 42.
'9 ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 48.
20 See ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 56.
21 See ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 57.
22 See ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 58.
23 Cf Rett R. Ludwikowski, Fundamental Constitutional Rights in the New
Constitutions of Eastern and Central Europe, 3 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 73, 90
(1995) (discussing the socialist concept of constitutional rights and noting that typical
socialist bills of rights contained similar provisions).
24 ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 44.
25 ALB. CoNsT. of 1976, art. 45.
26 ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 52.
27 ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 51.
28 ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 47.
29 ALB. CONSr. of 1976, art. 46.
30 See Ludwikowski, supra note 23, at 88 (noting that one of the fundamental
characteristics of the socialist concept of constitutional rights was the fact that "along
with rights and freedoms, they contained elaborate lists of duties"); see also U.S.S.R.
488 [Vol. 25
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rights were "inseparable from the fulfillment of [the citizens']
duties"3' and, in balancing rights and duties, "the general interest"
took priority.3 2 Some of the citizens' responsibilities included the
duties to work,33 to educate children according to communist
principles, 4  to care for their parents,35  and to "protect and
strengthen socialist property. 36  All citizens were obliged "to
respect and implement the Constitution and other laws" and to
preserve and strengthen "the socialist order and the
implementation of the rules of socialist co-existence."37  Thus,
while the rights accorded by the Constitution were extensive, so
were the accompanying duties. The most significant limitation of
rights and freedoms, though, stemmed from the fact that they
could not be exercised "in opposition to the socialist order."3
Despite its many similarities with the "common law" of the
socialist constitutions,3 9 the 1976 Constitution was not a mere copy
of either the Soviet or the Chinese constitution. True to its unique
version of Stalinist Marxism, 40 Albania pursued a more radical
course than even China or the Soviet Union. In the areas of
religious freedom and property rights, the 1976 Constitution
CONST. of 1977, art. 59 ("The exercise of rights and freedoms is inseparable from the
performance by the citizen of his duties.").
31 ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 39; see also Simons, supra note 8, at 5 (highlighting
this new characteristic of the 1976 Constitution).
32 ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 39.
33 ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 44 (In typical communist propagandist words, the
Constitution declared that "[w]ork is a duty and honour for every able-bodied citizen.").
31 ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 49 ("The parents are responsible for the upbringing
and communist education of the children.").
35 ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 49 ("The children are duty bound to care for parents
who are disabled and lack the necessary means of livelihood.").
36 ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 61.
37 ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 60.
38 ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 39; see Simons, supra note 8, at 5; see also
Ludwikowski, supra note 23, at 88 (noting that "under socialist law, the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of citizens could not be exercised to the detriment of the interests of
the state").
31 See Osakwe, supra note 15, at 157.
40 See generally ELEZ BIBERAJ, ALBANIA: A SOCIALIST MAVERICK (1990)
(providing an overview of political developments in Albania); ARSHI PIPA, ALBANIAN
STALINISM: IDEO-POLITICAL ASPECTS (1990) (tracing different aspects of historical
developments in Albania).
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greatly restricted individual rights. 4  The Constitution declared
that "[t]he state recognizes no religion whatever and supports
atheist propaganda for the purpose of inculcating the scientific
materialist world outlook in people,4 2 and the Introduction
boasted that "[t]he foundations of religious obscurantism [have
been] smashed. 43 With respect to property rights, the Constitution
boasted that "private property and the exploitation of man by man
have been liquidated and are forbidden.",44 Socialist property was
the "inviolable basis of the socialist order" and enjoyed the
protection of the state.45  Individual rights were limited to
"personal property," which was defined as "income from work and
other lawful sources, dwelling houses and other objects which
serve to meet personal and family material and cultural needs. 46
The Chinese and Soviet constitutions defined "personal property"
similarly,47 although the Soviet Constitution did permit some
41 See, e.g., ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 37.
42 ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 37. Compare ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 37 with ALB.
CONST. of 1946 (revised in 1950, amended in 1953, 1954, and 1958), art. 18, translated
in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: HISTORIC CONSTITUTIONS 9 (Albert
P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Franz eds., 1972) ("All the citizens are guaranteed the freedom
of conscience and of faith. The church is separated from the State. The religious
communities are free in matters of their belief as well as in their outer exercise and
practice .... The State may give material aid to religious communities."). Consider also
the provisions related to marriage ceremonies. The 1976 Constitution simply provided
that "[m]arriage is contracted before competent state organs." ALB. CONST. of 1976, art.
49. The 1946 Constitution, on the other hand, after noting that "[I]awful marriage can be
contracted only before the competent organs of the State," stated that "[a]fter the
celebration of lawful marriage the citizens may also celebrate religious marriage
according to the rules of their religion." ALB. CONST. of 1946, art. 19, translated in
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: HISTORIC CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at
10.
43 ALB. CONST. of 1976, introduction. Neither the Soviet Constitution of 1977 nor
the Chinese Constitution of 1978, adopted after the Albanian Constitution had come into
effect, made any such statements about religion. In fact, the Soviet Constitution declared
that "[clitizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of conscience, that is, the right to
profess any religion or to profess no religion at all, and to perform religious rites."
U.S.S.R. CONST. of 1977, art. 52.
44 ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 16.
45 ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 17.
46 ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 23.
47 See P.R.C. CONST. of 1978, art. 9 ("The state protects the right of citizens to own
lawfully earned income, savings, and other means of livelihood."); U.S.S.R. CONST. of
1977, art. 13 ("Earned income constitutes the basis of personal property of citizens of the
2000] CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POST-COMMUNIST ALBANIA
private enterprise.4 ' This was not the case in Albania.
As in all other socialist countries, the rights granted by the
1976 Albanian Constitution were not "self-executing; 4 9 that is, the
1976 Constitution provided no mechanism for their enforcement.
Citizens could not petition a court to obtain relief for constitutional
violations. Given that no judicial review was possible, the system
operated under the assumption that the legislative body itself was
responsible for maintaining the constitutionality of state action. °
Indeed, one of the express competences of the People's Assembly
was to "decide[] on the conformity of the laws with the
Constitution, and [to] interpret[] the laws."5' In this task, the
People's Assembly was aided by the Attorney General, whose
duty it was to submit "cases in which the laws and decrees are not
in conformity with the Constitution. ' 2
These constitutional guarantees were of little value in a system
that provided no mechanism for enforcement. History proved that
broadly defined rights wither away in the face of a dictatorial
government, which respects neither the Constitution nor individual
freedoms.53
III. The Constitution of 1998
A. Introduction to the New Constitution
With the fall of communism in 1990, the Constitution of 1976
USSR. Articles of everyday use, of personal consumption and comfort, and of the
subsidiary household, a dwelling, and savings from labor may be held in personal
ownership.").
48 See U.S.S.R. CONST. of 1977, art. 13 ("Citizens may have the use of plots of
land, made available in the manner provided by law, in order to run a subsidiary
household (including the keeping of livestock and fowl), to engage in fruit and vegetable
gardening, and also for individual housing construction.").
49 Ludwikowski, supra note 23, at 89.
50 See id. (In socialist countries, "[i]t was assumed the legislative body itself was
responsible for maintaining the constitutionality of state actions, and constitutional
review could not be exercised by extra-parliamentary bodies.").
51 ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 67.
52 ALB. CONST. of 1976, art. 105.
53 See ELEZ BIBERAJ, ALBANIA IN TRANSITION: THE ROCKY ROAD TO DEMOCRACY
71 (1998) (reporting that the communist regime engaged in "gross violations of human
and political rights"); see also id. at 102 (noting that the Albanian Party of Labor never
respected the rights proclaimed in the 1976 Constitution).
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lost its relevancy, and Albania faced the task of developing a new
constitutional order. To provide an interim structure, Parliament
approved in April 1991 the "Law on the Main Constitutional
Provisions," which was intended to remain in force until a new
constitution could be promulgated 4  The task of drafting a
constitution that both addressed Albania's historical concerns and
guaranteed a government of law proved to be a difficult one.
Instability in Albanian political life" prolonged the drafting
process. In November 1994, Democratic President Sali Berisha
called a referendum and placed a new constitution before the
Albanian people, but the draft was rejected. 6  After the
Democratic Party lost power in 1997, writing the new constitution
became the task of a government coalition-consisting primarily
of the Socialists, Social Democrats, and members of the
Democratic Alliance-and the opposition Republicans. 7  The
14 See id. at 102-03; RETT R. LUDWIKOWSKI, CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN THE
REGION OF FORMER SOVIET DOMINANCE 142 (1996). The 1991 Law on the Main
Constitutional Provisions was augmented by chapters on the Organization of the
Judiciary and the Constitutional Court, in April 1992, and by the Charter on
Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms, in March 1993. The text of the 1991
Constitutional Provisions as amended in 1992 and 1993 is available at Constitutional
Resource Home Page: Albania (visited Oct. 18, 1999)
<http://www.urich.edu/-jpjones/confinder/albcon.htm>.
11 See BIBERAJ, supra note 53, at 162-63 (recounting the difficulty of establishing a
new constitutional order in Albania). Between 1991 and 1998, Albania had eight
governments led by the following persons: Fatos Nano (Socialist), Ylli Bufi (Socialist),
Vilson Ahmeti (Unaffiliated), Alexander Meksi (Democratic), Alexander Meksi
(Democratic), Bashkim Fino (Socialist), Fatos Nano (Socialist), Pandeli Majko
(Socialist). See id. at 92, 114, 127, 139, 303, 325, 339; Constitution Watch, supra note 3,
at 4.
56 See BIBERAJ, supra note 53, at 162; LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 54, at 145-46;
Constitution Watch, A Country-by-Country Update on Constitutional Politics in Eastern
Europe: Albania, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Winter 1995, at 2, 3 (reporting that "[e]ighty
percent of the population participated in the referendum, and only 41 percent of the
participants voted in favor of the draft"). The Albanian opposition characterized the
draft as a "presidentialist Constitution with a weak judiciary unable to protect rights,"
Constitution Watch, supra, at 3. One commentator, however, has argued that voters did
not base their decisions on the substance of the draft but rejected it primarily because of
dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party's economic performance and anger at
government corruption. See BIBERAJ, supra note 53, at 175 (noting that "the majority of
Albanians did not notice the subtleties of the judicial system and presidential powers that
the opposition found so objectionable").
17 See Constitution Watch, A Country-by-Country Update on Constitutional
Politics in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR: Albania, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Fall 1997,
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Democratic Party subsequently boycotted the drafting process and
ultimately urged the people to reject the draft proposed in the
November 1998 referendum. 8 Despite the boycott, more than
ninety percent of those who participated in the referendum
approved the Constitution, which became binding on November
28, 1998, Albania's Independence Day. 9
The new Constitution is comprised of eighteen parts, which
establish a government based on the principle of separation of
powers, define relations between the central and local
governments, and set out individual rights and freedoms.60 For the
first time in its history, Albania made individual rights enforceable
against the state and adopted a Constitutional Court.6' It is to those
two aspects of the Constitution that this Comment now turns its
attention.
B. The Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms
Part Two of the Constitution codifies an extensive bill of
rights.6 2  No fewer than forty-nine of the 183 articles in the
document proclaim the rights and freedoms of the individual.63
Part Two consists of six chapters which establish specific types of
at 2, 5 (reporting that the Albanian Parliament had appointed Sabri Godo, chairman of
the Republican Party, and Arben Imami, minister of legislative reform, as co-chairs of
the Constitutional Commission).
58 See Constitution Watch, supra note 3, at 2.
'9 See id.
60 See KUSHTETUTA [CONSTITUTION] arts. 7 (separation of powers), 108-15 (local
government), 15-63 (personal rights and freedoms) [hereinafter ALB. CONST.]. All
citations to the Albanian Constitution in this Comment refer to the translation by
Kathleen Imholz and Krenar Lologi, published in 1 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD 1 (Gisbert H. Franz ed. & Kathleen Imholz & Krenar Loloi trans., 1999).
61 See ALB. CONST. arts. 42, para. 2, 124-34. Although the 1992 and 1993
amendments to the Law on the Main Constitutional Provisions provided enforceable
constitutional rights and established a Constitutional Court, see Law on the Main
Constitutional Provisions ch. V, art. 39, ch. IiA, arts. 17-28, available in Constitutional
Resource Home Page: Albania (visited Oct. 18, 1999)
<http://www.urich.edu/-jpjones/confinder/albcon.htm>, the Constitution-al Provisions
were intended to operate only as a temporary measure until a permanent constitutional
structure could be designed. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. The new
Constitution is the first document to provide such a permanent structure.
62 See ALB. CONST. arts. 15-63.
63 See ALB. CONST. arts. 8-11, 15-59.
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rights and freedoms. Chapter I outlines General Principles,64
Chapter II is dedicated to Personal Rights and Freedoms,65 Chapter
III focuses on Political Rights and Freedoms,66 and Chapter IV
describes Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Freedoms.67
Chapter V sets forth aspirational Social Objectives,68 and Chapter
VI introduces the new institution of the People's Advocate.69 The
Constitution enumerates both positive and negative rights, which,
with the exception of the rights expressed in Chapter V addressing
Social Objectives, are enforceable against the state and may be
defended in court.7°
1. General Principles
The Albanian Bill of Rights begins with a declaration that
fundamental human rights and freedoms "are indivisible,
inalienable, and inviolable and stand at the basis of the entire
juridical order."7 Organs of public power are obligated to respect
such rights and freedoms, as well as contribute to their
realization." With a few exceptions, these fundamental rights and
freedoms apply to foreigners and stateless persons within the
territory of Albania, as well as to Albanian citizens.73 Moreover,
they also extend to juridical persons, so long as these persons
comply with the law.74
The Constitution recognizes that certain limits on fundamental
rights may be necessary in a society committed to balancing the
64 See ALB. CONST. arts. 15-20.
65 See ALB. CONST. arts. 21-44.
66 See ALB. CONST. arts. 45-48.
67 See ALB. CONST. arts. 49-58.
68 See ALB. CONST. art. 59.
69 See ALB. CONST. arts. 60-63.
70 See ALB. CONST. art. 42, para. 2. ("Everyone, to protect his constitutional and
legal rights, freedoms, and interests ... has the right to a fair and public trial, within a
reasonable time, by an independent and impartial court specified by law.").
71 ALB. CONST. art. 15, para. 1.
72 See ALB. CONST. art. 15, para. 2. A comparison may be drawn here with the
German Basic Law principle of a social state (Sozialstaatlichkeit), which obligates the
legislature to work toward the realization of constitutional rights. See Donald P.
Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L.J. 837, 865 (1991).
73 See ALB. CONST. art. 16, para. 1.
74 See ALB. CONST. art. 16, para. 2.
[Vol. 25494
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interests of its members.75 Such limitations, however, must be "for
a public interest or for the protection of the rights of others," and
must be established by law.76 The Constitution establishes a test of
proportionality between the interest advanced and the limitation
imposed.77 Ultimately, the restriction of a right may not exceed
"the limitations provided for in the European Convention on
Human Rights."" By incorporating the European Convention on
Human Rights, the Constitution effectively provides an objective,
external standard by which the Albanian state must measure its
actions.
The General Principles also recognize equality of all before the
law and prohibit unjust discrimination on a number of grounds.79
The list of prohibitions is not exclusive, however, and allows for a
future expansion of these grounds.8°  Yet, the prohibition on
discrimination is not categorical, as the Constitution states that
unequal treatment may be permissible if "reasonable and objective
legal grounds . . . exist."'" The text, however, is not clear as to
how compelling such grounds must be.
The Chapter on General Principles concludes with a provision
granting "full equality before the law" to national minorities."
The Constitution protects minorities' rights to "freely express...
their ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic belonging."83
Moreover, it recognizes minorities' right to be educated in their
"mother tongue" and to "unite in organizations . . . for the
,,84protection of their interests and identity.
75 See ALB. CONST. art. 17.
76 ALB. CONST. art. 17, para. 1.
77 See id.
78 ALB. CONST. art. 17, para. 2.
79 See ALB. CONST. art. 18, para. 2 ("No one may be unjustly discriminated against
for reasons such as gender, race, religion, ethnicity, language, political, religious or
philosophical beliefs, economic condition, education, social status, or ancestry.").
80 See id. (The words "such as" indicate that this list is not all-inclusive.)
8 1 ALB. CONST. art. 18, para. 3 ("No one may be discriminated against for reasons
mentioned in paragraph 2 if reasonable and objective legal grounds do not exist.").
82 ALB. CONST. art. 20, para. 1.
83 ALB. CONST. art. 20, para. 2.
84 Id.
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2. Personal Rights and Freedoms
The Chapter dedicated to Personal Rights and Freedoms is the
longest chapter of Part Two of the Constitution. Its twenty-four
articles embed in Albania's fundamental charter many guarantees
against state intrusion in private life. 5 First, the Constitution
declares that "[t]he life of a person is protected by law,"" and
guarantees freedom of expression,87 the right to information,
freedom of conscience, '9 and freedom of religion. 9° It also bans
cruel, inhuman, or degrading torture and punishment, 9' and
prohibits forced labor except during the performance of military
service, during a state of emergency, and when decreed by judicial
decision. 92 All have the right to choose their places of residence93
and may go freely out of the country.94
The Chapter goes on to list the circumstances under which a
person's liberty might be limited95 and sets out the procedural
requirements for the protection of a person's rights. 96  For
example, one whose liberty is taken away "has the right to be
notified immediately... of the reasons for this measure, as well as
the accusation made against him."97  Furthermore, "he has no
85 See ALB. CONST. arts. 21-44.
86 ALB. CONST. art. 21.
87 See ALB. CONST. art. 22, para. 1.
88 See ALB. CONST. art. 23, para. 1.
89 See ALB. CONST. art. 24, para. 1.
90 See id.
91 See ALB. CONST. art. 25.
92 See ALB. CONST. art. 26 ("No one may be required to perform forced labor,
except in cases of the execution of a judicial decision, the performance of military
service, or for a service that results from a state of emergency, war or natural disaster
that threatens human life or health.").
93 See ALB. CONST. art. 38, para. 1.
94 See ALB. CONST. art. 38, para. 2.
95 See ALB. CONST. art. 27, para. 2 (providing that a person's liberty may not be
taken away except when 1) he is imprisoned by the court; 2) he fails to comply with
court orders; 3) there exist "reasonable suspicions that he has committed a criminal
offense or to prevent the commission by him of a criminal offense;" 4) he is a minor and
needs supervision for the purpose of education; 5) he carries a contagious disease, is
mentally incompetent and dangerous to society; or 6) he is an illegal immigrant).
96 See ALB. CONST. art. 28.
97 ALB. CONST. art. 28, para. 1.
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obligation to make a declaration and has the right to communicate
immediately with a lawyer."98 If a person's liberty is taken away
extrajudicially, the person has a right to address a judge at any
time, and the judge is required to rule on the legality of the action
within forty-eight hours.99
Protections against unjust criminal convictions are enhanced
by a prohibition against ex post facto laws,'00 by the establishment
of a presumption of innocence,0 ' by guarantees against self-
incrimination or incrimination of one's family members,' 2 by a
prohibition against double jeopardy,' and by a number of
procedural safeguards during trial °4 Accused persons enjoy the
right to be heard before being judged.' 5 The right to be heard is
unavailable, however, to one "who is hiding from justice;"'0 6 thus,
in absentia convictions appear to be constitutional.
The Constitution also recognizes the inviolability of one's
residence and allows only searches conducted pursuant to law.' 7
Individuals are guaranteed the "freedom and secrecy of
correspondence"'0 8 and have the right to keep personal data
confidential.'0 Moreover, "[e]veryone has the right to become
98 ALB. CONST. art. 28, para. 1.
99 See ALB. CONST. art. 28, para. 4.
'oo See ALB. CONST. art. 29, para. 1. The Constitution does make an exception to
this general rule. One may be charged after the fact for acts which, "according to
international law, constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity." Id.
101 See ALB. CONST. art. 30 ("Everyone is considered innocent so long as his guilt is
not proven by a final judicial decision.").
102 See ALB. CONST. art. 32, para. 1 ("No one may be obliged to testify against
himself or his family or to confess his guilt.").
103 See ALB. CONST. art. 34 ("No one may be punished more than one time for the
same criminal act nor be tried again, except for cases when the re-adjudication of the
case is decided on by a higher court, in a manner specified by law.").
104 See ALB. CONST. art. 31 (establishing the rights to be notified of offenses
charged, to have time and space to prepare a defense, to have the assistance of a
translator free of charge, to be assisted by counsel, and to question witnesses).
See ALB. CONST. art. 33, para. I ("No one may be denied the right to be heard
before being judged.").
106 ALB. CONST. art. 33, para. 2.
'0' See ALB. CONST. art. 37, para. 1 ("The inviolability of the residence is
guaranteed.").
108 ALB. CONST. art. 36.
109 See ALB. CONST. art. 35, para. 1 ("No one may be obliged, except when the law
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acquainted with data collected about him, except for the cases
provided by law."" This section also establishes a right to
"request the correcting or expunging of untrue or incorrect data or
data collected in violation of the law."' 11
Unlike the Constitution of 1976, the current Constitution
guarantees the right to private property".2  and allows
expropriations "only for public interests"' 13 and "only against fair
compensation." ' 14  Significantly, the Constitution also provides
that "the freedom, property, and rights recognized in the
Constitution and by law may not be infringed without due
process.""'  All are guaranteed the right to appeal judicial
decisions to a higher court,' 16 and all enjoy a right to
indemnification when "damaged because of an unlawful act,
action or failure to act of the state organs."
' 17
3. Political Rights and Freedoms
The Chapter on Political Rights and Freedoms grants the rights
to vote and to run for public office to all citizens who are eighteen
years old,"8  with a few well-defined exceptions."' The
Constitution recognizes the right to organize for any lawful
purpose 2 ° but prohibits the creation of organizations or societies
that pursue unconstitutional purposes." ' All enjoy the right to
requires it, to make public data connected with his person.").
110 ALB. CONST. art. 35, para. 3.
I ALB. CONST. art. 35, para. 4.
112 See ALB. CONST. art. 41, para. I ("The right of private property is guaranteed.").
''3 ALB. CONST. art. 41, para. 3.
"' ALB. CONST. art. 41, para. 4.
115 ALB. CONST. art. 42, para. 1.
116 See ALB. CONST. art. 43 ("Everyone has the right to appeal a judicial decision to
a higher court, except when the Constitution provides otherwise.").
"17 ALB. CONST. art. 44.
118 See ALB. CONST. art. 45, para. 1.
119 See ALB. CONST. art. 45, para. 2 ("Citizens who have been declared mentally
incompetent by a final court decision do not have the right to elect."). Also, those who
are "serving a sentence that deprives them of freedom have only the right to elect," and
not the right to be elected. ALB. CONST. art. 45, para. 3.
120 See ALB. CONST. art. 46, para. 1.
121 See ALB. CONST. art. 46, para. 3.
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meet peacefully and without arms,122 as well as the right to petition
the government. 123
4. Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and
Freedoms
The Chapter on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
Freedoms balances a concern for the welfare of individuals with
pragmatism regarding the limited means of the state. The Chapter
declares that "[e]veryone has the right to earn the means of living
by lawful work that he has chosen or accepted himself.' ' 24 Yet,
while all are free to choose their profession or place of work, 125 the
state does not undertake to provide the means of livelihood for
those within its borders. Rather, the Constitution limits itself to
ensuring the right to unite in labor organizations' and the right to
strike.
27
The state does, however, guarantee other economic rights. For
example, "[e]veryone has the right to social security in old age or
when he is unable to work,"' 28 and one who remains unemployed
for reasons beyond his or her control and has no other means of
support is entitled to "assistance under the conditions provided by
law.' 29  Also, "[c]itizens enjoy in an equal manner the right to
health care from the state,"' 130 and "[e]veryone has the right to
122 See ALB. CONST. art. 47, para. 1. The law, however, may prescribe some
limitations on peaceful meetings in squares and places of public passage. See ALB.
CONST. art. 47, para. 2.
123 See ALB. CONST. art. 48 ("Everyone, by himself or together with others, may
direct requests, complaints or comments to the public organs, which are obliged to
answer in the time periods and conditions set by law.").
124 ALB. CONST. art. 49, para. 1.
125 See id.
126 See ALB. CONST. art. 50 ("Employees have the right to unite freely in labor
organizations for the defense of their work interests.").
127 See ALB. CONST. art. 51, para. I ("The right of an employee to strike in
connection with work relations is guaranteed."). Some limitations on the right to strike
are permitted, however, in order to "assure essential social services." ALB. CONST. art.
51, para. 2.
128 ALB. CONST. art. 52, para. 1.
129 ALB. CONST. art. 52, para. 2.
130 ALB. CONST. art. 55, para. 1.
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health insurance."' 13
As in other European constitutions, marriage and the family
enjoy special consideration under the Albanian Constitution. 13 2
"Children, the young, pregnant women and new mothers have the
right to special protection."'33 Furthermore, "[c]hildren born out of
wedlock have equal rights with those born within marriage,"''3 4 and
all children have the right to be protected from "violence, ill
treatment, exploitation and their use for work."'35
On the social front, everyone has the right to an education,
13 6
and both mandatory primary education and general high school
education in public schools are free.'37 Everyone has a right to be
informed about "the status of the environment and its
protection,""' and "freedom of artistic creation and scientific
research" are guaranteed to all. 39 To that end, copyright is also
protected by law. 1
40
5. Social Objectives
Completing the basic structure of rights and freedoms, the
Constitution sets out objectives in areas in which the state "aims to
supplement private initiative and responsibility," so long as there
are "means at its disposal."' 14' The state, for example, will strive
(1) to help all persons who are able to work obtain "employment
13 ALB. CONST. art. 55, para. 2 ("Everyone has the right to health insurance
pursuant to the procedure provided by law.").
132 See ALB. CONST. art. 53, para. 2 ("Marriage and family enjoy special protection
of the state."). Compare ALB. CONST. art. 53, para. 2 with GRUNDGESETZ
[CONSTITUTION] [GG] art. 6(1), translated in 7 CONSTrrUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 97, 107 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Franz eds., 1994) ("Marriage and
family shall enjoy the special protection of the state."). The Albanian Constitution also
recognizes every person's "right to get married and have a family." ALB. CONST. art. 53,
para. 1.
133 ALB. CONST. art. 54, para. 1.
134 ALB. CONST. art. 54, para. 2.
15 ALB. CONST. art. 54, para. 3.
136 See ALB. CONST. art. 57, para. 1.
137 See ALB. CONST. art. 57, para. 5.
"I ALB. CONST. art. 56.
139 ALB. CONST. art. 58, para. 1.
140 See ALB. CONST. art. 58, para. 2.
14" ALB. CONST. art. 59, para. 1.
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under suitable conditions,' 42 (2) to fulfill "the housing needs of its
citizens," 4 1 (3) to obtain "the highest possible standard of health,
physical and mental,"'" (4) to provide education to all children,
the young, and the unemployed, 4 1 (5) to preserve a healthy
environment "for the present and future generations,"'' 46 (6) to
ensure "rational exploitation of forests, water, pastures and other
natural resources,"'' 47 (7) to care for and help "the aged, orphans
and persons with disabilities,"'' 48 (8) to develop sports and
recreational activities, 49 (9) to integrate disabled people in
society, 5 ° and (10) to protect "the national cultural heritage. '
Unlike other rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution,
"[f]ulfillment of social objectives may not be claimed directly in
court.'
152
6. People's Advocate
The creation of the position of the People's Advocate
underscores the importance of fundamental rights and freedoms in
Albania's new constitutional order. The People's Advocate is an
independent institution,' 53 whose objective is to "defend[] the
rights, freedoms and lawful interests of individuals from unlawful
or improper actions or failures to act of the organs of public
administration.' ' 4  The People's Advocate is elected by three-
fifths of the members of the Assembly,'55 serves a five-year term
1412 ALB. CONST. art. 59, para. l(a).
143 ALB. CONST. art. 59, para. 1(b).
144 ALB. CONST. art. 59, para. 1(c).
"41 See ALB. CONST. art. 59, para. I(d).
146 ALB. CONST. art. 59, para. 1(e).
147 ALB. CONST. art. 59, para. 1(f).
148 ALB. CONST. art. 59, para. 1(g).
149 See ALB. CONST. art. 59, para. 1(h).
150 See ALB. CONST. art. 59, para. l(i).
15' ALB. CONST. art. 59, para. 1(j).
152 ALB. CONST. art. 59, para. 2.
151 See ALB. CONST. art. 60, para. 2 ("The People's Advocate is independent in the
exercise of his duties.").
114 ALB. CONST. art. 60, para. 1.
"I See ALB. CONST. art. 61, para. 1.
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with the right of reelection,'56 and enjoys the same immunity as a
judge of the High Court.'57
To qualify for this position, an individual must be an Albanian
citizen, must have obtained a post-secondary degree, and must
have "recognized knowledge and recognized activity in the field
of human rights and law."'58  "The People's Advocate may not
take part in any political party [or] carry on any other political,
state, or professional activity" while in office.'59  He must
"present[] an annual report before the Assembly"' 160 and may also
"request the Assembly to hear him on matters he determines
important."'' 61  "The People's Advocate has the right to make
recommendations and to propose measures when he observes
violations of human rights ... by the public administration,"' 162 and
"public organs and officials are obligated to present to the
People's Advocate all documents and information requested by
him.
, 163
7. Limitations of Constitutional Rights
Consistent with the Constitution's perception of fundamental
rights and freedoms as "indivisible, inalienable, and inviolable,"'
164
a person may not be deprived of these rights, except through due
process of law. In cases of emergency, however, public interest
may necessitate some curtailment of individual freedoms. To
accommodate such pressing needs, the Constitution contains
specific provisions regarding Extraordinary Measures. 166 Even in a
156 See id.
157 See ALB. CONST. art. 61, para. 3. The People's Advocate can be discharged only
by a three-fifths vote of the Assembly, acting "on the reasoned complaint of not less than
one-third of the deputies." ALB. CONST. art. 62, paras. 1, 2.
158 ALB. CONST. art. 61, para. 2.
19 ALB. CONST. art. 61, para. 4.
160 ALB. CONST. art. 63, para. 1.
161 ALB. CONST. art. 63, para. 2.
162 ALB. CONST. art. 63, para. 3.
163 See ALB. CONST. art. 63, para. 4.
164 ALB. CONST. art. 15.
165 The only exception to this rule has already been noted. See supra note 106 and
accompanying text. A person may lose his right to be heard before being judged if he is
evading justice. See ALB. CONST. art. 33, para. 2
166 See ALB. CONST. art. 170-76.
502 [Vol. 25
20001 CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POST-COMMUNIST ALBANIA
state of war, a state of emergency, or a natural disaster, however,
the state organs are not empowered to limit certain rights."' When
acting under authority of Extraordinary Measures, state organs can
act only as long as those conditions exist and must specify the
rights which are being limited.'68 Thus, safeguards are in place to
protect against abuse of emergency powers.
8. Evaluating the Rights and Freedoms Provisions
The drafters of the Albanian Constitution may have benefited
from the length of time that passed between the fall of the
communist regime and the approval of the Constitution. Because
Albania was one of the last countries to finalize its constitutional
• 169
project,"9 the experience of other Eastern European nations may
have proven instructive in the constitution-making process. Part
Two of the Constitution appears carefully designed to protect
individual rights and liberties against possible intrusions by a
totalitarian state. 7° The Constitution reflects lessons learned from
the country's communist past and emphasizes the role of the
individual in a democratic society.' 1 Moreover, it recognizes the
importance of private property and the need to encourage
creativity and innovation.7 2  Even more significantly, the
Constitution allows citizens to protect their rights through judicial
action'73 and ultimately to seek redress through the Constitutional
167 See ALB. CONST. art. 175 (listing specific rights that may not be curtailed). For
example, the government may not suspend equal treatment before the law, discriminate
on certain grounds, limit the rights of minorities, curtail freedom of conscience or of
religion, subject anyone to torture, or declare individuals guilty of offenses ex post facto.
See id.
168 See ALB. CONST. art. 175, para. 3.
169 See supra note I (listing the Eastern European and former Soviet nations that
have changed their constitutions since 1990, and when the new constitutions were
adopted).
170 See ALB. CONST. arts. 15-63.
"I See ALB. CONST. arts. 21-48; supra notes 85-123 and accompanying text
(enumerating a long list of personal and political rights and freedoms).
172 See ALB. CONST. arts. 41-42, 58; supra notes 112-14, 139-40 and accompanying
text (discussing protections for private property and creative endeavors).
173 See ALB. CONST. art. 42, para. 2 ("Everyone, to protect his constitutional and
legal rights, freedoms, and interests ... has the right to a fair and public trial, within a
reasonable time, by an independent and impartial court specified by law.").
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Court.
7 4
True to its Western European outlook, the Constitution
acknowledges numerous positive rights; yet, in this area, the
Albanian drafters may have been more cautious than their Eastern
European neighbors. In the final balance, monetary concerns may
have outweighed liberal aspirations. For example, while the
Albanian Constitution contains several programmatic provisions
aimed at improving the standard of living for Albanian citizens,'75
it explicitly declines to make them self-enforcing.' Moreover, the
positive rights that have been recognized are much narrower in
scope than those found in other constitutions. Thus, unlike the
citizens of Lithuania, for example, the citizens of Albania have no
right to "rest and leisure.' 7 7  Also, the vague right "to social
protection of work"'178 pales in comparison with the Slovak
worker's right to remuneration "sufficient to ensure the
employee's dignified standard of living," to protection "against
arbitrary dismissal and discrimination at the place of work," and to
"adequate rest after work."'79  The Albanian Constitution does
recognize that "[c]itizens enjoy in an equal manner the right to
health care from the state."18 The meaning of this right, however,
is rather vague. Does it prohibit discrimination without
committing the state to providing a particular level of care? Does
the care have to be free of charge? The text is not clear on these
174 See ALB. CONST. art. 131(i) (granting the Court jurisdiction to decide on the
"final adjudication of the individual complaints for the violation of their constitutional
rights to due process of law, after all legal means for the protection of those rights have
been exhausted").
' See ALB. CONST. art. 59; supra notes 141-52 and accompanying text (describing
in detail the Chapter on Social Objectives).
176 See ALB. CONST. art. 59, para. 2 ("Fulfillment of social objectives may not be
claimed directly in court.").
177 LITH. CONST. art. 49, translated in 1I CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD, supra note 1, at 8 ("Every person shall have the right to rest and leisure, as well
as to annual paid holidays. Working hours shall be established by law."); see also POL.
CONST. art. 66, para. 2, translated in 15 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD, supra note 1, at 15 (noting that an "employee shall have the right by law to
specified days free from work as well as annual paid holidays").
178 ALB. CONST. art. 49, para. 2.
19 SLOVK. CONST. art. 36, translated in 16 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD, supra note 1, at 75.
180 ALB. CONST. art. 55, para. 1.
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points. One can compare this language with the much clearer text
of the Lithuanian Constitution, which notes that "[t]he State shall
take care of people's health and shall guarantee medical aid and
services in the event of sickness."' 8'
Despite the narrower scope of its positive rights provisions, the
Albanian Constitution is a liberal document which offers
significant protection to human rights. It provides a flexible
structure which the Albanian people can expand as they develop a
democratic tradition. Most significantly, unlike the communist
Constitution of 1976, the current Constitution combines an
extensive bill of rights with structural avenues through which
those rights can be protected and enforced. Those structural
safeguards, embodied in the Constitutional Court, are the subject
of the following discussion.
C. The Constitutional Court
The 1998 Constitution constructs an elaborate scheme for the
maintenance of the constitutional order. Part Eight establishes a
Constitutional Court [hereinafter Court], which functions to
"guarantee[] respect for the Constitution and make[] final
interpretations of it.'
82
181 LITH. CONST. art. 53, translated in 11 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD, supra note 1, at 8; see also POL. CONST. art. 68, para. 2, translated in 15
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 1, at 15 ("Equal access to
health care services, financed from public funds, is assured by public authorities to
citizens, irrespective of their material situation.").
182 ALB. CONST. art. 124, para. 1. The prominent placement of these provisions may
be an indication of the importance of the Constitutional Court in the Albanian system of
government. If the structure of a document is interpreted as conveying a message about
its meaning, in other words if "[t]he topography of [the document] is a product of its
geology," MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE
ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION 229 (1967), then the importance of the
Constitutional Court cannot be underestimated. The provisions relating to the
Constitutional Court come immediately after provisions outlining the functions of the
Assembly, the President of the Republic, the Council of Ministers, Local Government,
and Normative Acts and International Agreements. See ALB. CONST. arts. 74-123. In
contrast, a prior draft listed the Constitutional Court provisions at the very end of the
Constitution, as Part XVII, and they were followed only by measures regarding the
Revision of the Constitution and Transitory and Final Dispositions. See DRAFr
ALBANIAN CONSTITUTION AS OF AUGUST 4, 1998, available in Constitution of Albania
(visited Oct. 18, 1999) <http://www.urich.edu/-jpjones/confinder/ALBANIA.htm>.
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1. Institutional Concerns
a. Composition of the Court
The Court consists of nine members who are "appointed by the
President of the Republic with the consent of the Assembly."'
83
The judges are selected from "among lawyers with high
qualifications"'84 and must have work experience of "not less than
15 years in the profession."'85 While on the Court, a judge may not
engage in "any other state, political or private activity."''8 6 Judges
serve on the Court for nine years without the right of
reappointment.'87 One-third of the Court, however, is "renewed
every three years, according to the procedure determined by
law."'88  If a judge's seat becomes vacant before his term has
ended, the President, with the consent of the Assembly, appoints a
new judge to that seat to complete the term of the preceding
judge.'8 9 The proceedings of the Court are directed by the
Chairman, who also is appointed by the President with the consent
of the Assembly.' 90 The Chairman is selected from the ranks of the
Court and serves a three-year term. '9'
b. Protection of the Members of the Court
The Constitution grants specific protections to judges serving
on the Constitutional Court. A judge of this Court "cannot be
criminally prosecuted without the consent of the ... Court."' 92 He
183 ALB. CONST. art. 125, para. 1.
184 ALB. CONST. art. 125, para. 2.
185 Id. A cursory reading may miss the curious consequences of this requirement.
Experience in the profession seems like a quality that every judge of the Constitutional
Court should have. In November 1998, however, when the Constitution went into effect,
this requirement of 15 years of experience assured that every member of the Court would
have begun his career during the communist rule of Enver Hoxha. It seems that until
2005 (15 years after the fall of communism in Albania) service in the Constitutional
Court is legally limited to those who received their training under the communist regime.
186 ALB. CONST. art. 130.
187 See ALB. CONST. art. 125, para. 2.
188 ALB. CONST. art. 125, para. 3.
89 See ALB. CONST. art. 127, para. 3.
'90 See ALB. CONST. art. 125, para. 4.
191 See id.
192 ALB. CONST. art. 126.
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may be "detained or arrested only if apprehended in the
commission of a crime or immediately after its commission."'1 93 In
such circumstances, the detaining or arresting authorities must
notify the Court immediately.9 4 The Court may "consent ... to
send[ing] the arrested judge to court."' 95 If, however, such consent
is not forthcoming within twenty-four hours, the authorities are
"obliged to release" the judge.196
c. Removal of the Members of the Court
Removal of a judge from office can occur only under certain
circumstances. Article 128 provides that "[t]he judge of the
Constitutional Court can be removed from office by the Assembly
by two-thirds of all its members for violations of the Constitution,
commission of a crime, mental or physical incapacity, [and] acts
and behavior that seriously discredit the position and reputation of
a judge."' 97 The Assembly's decision, however, is not final.' 98 It
must be reviewed by the Constitutional Court, which must verify
"the existence of one of these grounds" and "declare[] the removal
from duty of the member of the Constitutional Court."' 99
Article 127 also contains removal provisions. This section
provides that a judge's term ends when the judge "is sentenced
with a final decision for commission of a crime;" when he "does
not show up for duty, without reason, for more than 6 months;"
when the judge "reaches 70 years of age;" when he resigns; or
when he "is declared incompetent to act with a final judicial
decision."200 "The end of the term of a judge is declared with a
decision of the Constitutional Court.,
20 1
193 Id.
114 See id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 ALB. CONST. art. 128.
198 See id.; cf U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 4 (noting that upon conviction for a high crime
or misdemeanor, removal from office is immediate).
'99 ALB. CONST. art. 128.
200 ALB. CONST. art. 127, para. 1. Interestingly, this section does not provide that a
judge's term ends upon his death. See id.
201 ALB. CONST. art. 127, para. 2.
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2. Assessment of the Structural Provisions
The constitutional design of the Court seeks to reconcile two
conflicting goals. First, it is intended to allow the Court to reach
its decisions without undue political influence. In serving its role
as the guarantor of respect for the Constitution, the Court should
be able to invalidate even politically popular laws, if they violate
the Constitution. Given that judges cannot be reappointed, they
will not be unduly concerned with pleasing the legislature or the
President, who jointly hold the power of appointment. Article 128
further enhances the independence of the Court by granting the
Court power of review over the Assembly's decision to remove a
judge from the Court.2 °2 If the Assembly overreaches and attempts
to use its removal power simply for political reasons, the Court is
free not to "verify" the existence of one of the constitutional
grounds for removal.0 3
The organizational structure of the Constitutional Court aims
to promote another goal. It seeks to infuse political influence into
the process of constitutional interpretation. The rotation of one-
third of the Court every three years allows for change, while
preserving continuity in the decision-making process.2 4 The
power to renew the Court entirely within nine years also gives the
President and the legislature some control over a "loose cannon"
201Court. Moreover, the Assembly may remove a judge for "acts
and behavior that seriously discredit the position and reputation of
a judge., 20 6 What acts and behavior fall within this provision is
left unanswered. What seems unusual about the structure,
however, is that the majority of the Court must agree that the acts
of their peer do indeed "discredit" the bench, as the Assembly
contends.2 7
202 See ALB. CONST. art. 128 ("The decision of the Assembly is reviewed by the
Constitutional Court, which, upon verification of the existence of one of these grounds,
declares the removal from duty of the member of the Constitutional Court.").
203 See id.
204 See ALB. CONST. art. 125, para. 3.
205 The Albanian rotation provisions are similar to those used by the French Conseil
Constitutionnel, which also is renewed completely every nine years. See F.L. Morton,
Judicial Review in France: A Comparative Analysis, 36 AM. J. COMP. L 89, 98 (1988).
206 ALB. CONST. art. 128.
207 Id. Compare this approach with that expressed by the United States Supreme
Court in Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). There, the Court denied the
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The Constitution seems unclear regarding the circumstances
under which a judge can be removed for the commission of a
crime. Articles 126, 127, and 128 do not adequately address this
issue. Assume, for example, that a judge of the Constitutional
Court commits a crime. Article 126 provides that "the judge...
cannot be criminally prosecuted without the consent of the
Constitutional Court."2 °8  If the Court does consent to the
prosecution, then the case will be heard in the ordinary court
system. °9 Suppose the judge is "sentenced with a final decision"
for the commission of the crime.10 Under Article 127, the term of
the judge would end." Yet, Article 127 also provides that the
"end of the term of a judge is declared with a decision of the
Constitutional Court."22 The question is whether, in reaching this
decision, the Constitutional Court would be able to review the
determination of guilt reached by the ordinary court system or
whether the Court must take the ordinary court decision as final.
Again, no clear answer emerges from the text. Article 128 further
complicates the issue. Under that Article, one of the grounds for
removal of a judge is "commission of a crime." '213 But under that
same provision, the Constitutional Court is empowered to verify
former district judge's claim that the Court could review his conviction by the Senate
and removal from office. Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that
"judicial review would be inconsistent with the Framers' insistence that our system be
one of checks and balances" and dismissed an argument that "would place final
reviewing authority with respect to impeachment in the hands of the same body that the
impeachment is meant to regulate." Id. at 234-35.
208 ALB. CONST. art. 126.
209 Cf id. ("If the Constitutional Court does not give its consent within 24 hours to
send the arrested judge to court, the competent organ is obliged to release him."
(emphasis added)). The term "court" appears to refer to an ordinary court. Yet, it is
unclear which court in the ordinary system would try such a case. Article 141, in
outlining the jurisdiction of the High Court-the highest court of the ordinary system,
states that the High Court "has original jurisdiction when adjudicating criminal charges
against... judges of the Constitutional Court." AL3. CONST. art. 141, para. I. While
this provision makes clear that a judge of the Constitutional Court may be tried by the
High Court in a criminal matter, it does not resolve whether a Constitutional Court judge
must be tried by the High Court. Article 141 does not say that the High Court's
jurisdiction is exclusive. Thus, a reasonable reading of the text leads one to believe that
a Constitutional Court judge also may be tried by another court of the ordinary system.
210 ALB. CONST. art. 127, para. 1(a).
211 See id.
212 ALB. CONST. art. 127, para. 2.
213 ALB. CONST. art. 128.
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the existence of one of the specified grounds and must review the
decision of the Assembly.1 Should such review power be
applicable when an ordinary court decision is involved? The
Constitution seems to be silent on the point.
Further questions arise from a careful reading of Article 128.
Does this provision empower the Assembly itself to try a
Constitutional Court judge in order to determine whether a crime
has been committed? Or does the Assembly vote on the issue only
after the judge has been convicted in the ordinary court system? If
the latter question is answered in the affirmative, then the
Assembly has the power to review a decision of the judiciary
branch of government, which seems to violate separation of
powers principles. Also, what happens if the Assembly fails to
muster a vote of two-thirds of its members? It appears that the
country would be left with a judge who has been convicted of a
crime yet cannot be removed from office.
Having discussed the institutional framework of the Court, this
Comment turns next to the Court's jurisdiction.
3. Jurisdiction of the Court
a. Subject Matter
The Albanian Constitution has adopted a system of mixed
concrete and abstract review, similar to the German model."5
Thus, upon the request of specified governmental actors,2"6 the
Court has authority to comment abstractly on the constitutionality
of a law even in the absence of a case or controversy. 7 The Court
may also decide a constitutional issue when such a determination
214 Id.
215 See ALB. CONST. art. 131; cf. Ludwikowski, supra note 23, at 97 & n.75
(explaining that concrete review involves raising constitutional issues before lower
courts in connection with a specific case or controversy, while abstract review allows
governmental actors to submit a law or hypothetical constitutional question to the Court
for review (citing Mauro Cappelletti & William Cohen, Two Methods of Reviewing a
Constitutional Question: "Incidenter" and "Principaliter, " in COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 84-90 (1979)).
Appendix A provides a chart illustrating the jurisdiction of the Court.
216 See infra notes 238-41, 246-51 and accompanying text for a detailed list of those
actors.
217 See ALB. CONST. art. 131(a)-(d).
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218is necessary for the disposition of a case. Moreover, the Court
may rule on cases that are brought by individuals, for "the
violation of their constitutional rights to [the] due process of law"
if these individuals have exhausted "all legal means for the
protection of those rights.,,2'9 The Court has broad authority as the
final interpreter of the Constitution. 22 In carrying out its duty, the
Court is "subject only to the Constitution. 221  Indeed, the
Constitution fairly lends itself to the view that the Court is an
institution that stands outside and above the legislative, executive,
and ordinary judicial powers of the state.
Under Article 131, the Court has the power to review
legislation and decide on the "compatibility of the law with the
Constitution or with international agreements as provided in
Article 122. "222 This provision resembles Article 93(2) of the
German Basic Law223 and seems to grant the Court only the power
224of a posteriori abstract review. When the constitutionality of
international agreements is at issue, however, the Court can assess
211 See ALB. CONST. art. 145, para. 2.
219 ALB. CONST. art. 13 1(i).
220 See ALB. CONST. art. 124, para. 1.
221 ALB. CONST. art. 124, para. 2. Compare ALB. CONST. art. 124, para. 2 with ALB.
CONST. art. 145, para. 1 (regular judges are "subject only to the Constitution and the
laws" (emphasis added)).
222 ALa. CONST. art. 131(a). Under Article 122, a ratified international agreement
"has superiority over laws of the country that are not compatible with it." ALB. CONST.
art. 122, para. 2.
223 See GRUNDGESETZ art. 93(2), translated in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD, supra note 132, at 149 (noting that the Federal Constitutional Court shall
rule "in case of disagreement or doubt as to the formal and material compatibility of
federal or Land legislation with this Basic Law").
224 This reading is supported by the fact that, with respect to unratified international
agreements, the Court is granted explicit a priori abstract review powers. See ALB.
CONST. art. 131 (b). Constitutions that grant a priori review powers are generally explicit
about such intentions. See, e.g., ROM. CONST. art. 144(a), translated in 15
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 1, at 34-35 (The
Constitutional Court has the duty "to pronounce on the constitutionality of laws before
their promulgation at the request of the president of Romania, one of the presidents of
the two chambers ... the Supreme Court of Justice, at least 50 deputies or at least 25
senators, as well as, officially, on initiatives revising the Constitution." (emphasis
added)). Moreover, a priori abstract review powers are relatively rare; of all of the
constitutions cited in supra note 1, only the Romanian Constitution provides for a priori
abstract review. See id.
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their "compatibility . . .with the Constitution, prior to their
ratification." '225  The Court also has power to review the
"compatibility of normative acts of the central and local organs [of
government] with the Constitution and international agreements" 226
and is charged with resolving "conflicts of competencies between
[the three] powers [of government], as well as between central
government and local government. '27 The Court may also decide
the constitutionality of political parties228 and of referenda and their
results.2 9 Finally, the Court is responsible for resolving any issues
regarding the election of the President and the members of the
Assembly, as well as their "incompatibility in exercising the
functions" of their respective offices.23°
Serving as a check on the power the Assembly, the Court plays
a role in "verif[ying] the guilt of the President of the Republic"
and "declar[ing] his discharge from duty" under Article 90.21' The
Court also "verifies conclusively" whether the President is so
225 ALB. CONST. art. 131(b).
226 ALB. CONST. art. 131 (c).
227 ALB. CONST. art. 131(d). For example, under Article 115, the Court has the
power to review a decision of the Council of Ministers to dissolve or discharge a
"directly elected organ of a local government unit." ALB. CONST. art. 115, para. 1. The
dissolved or discharged organ, however, must complain to the Constitutional Court
within 15 days of the decision by the Council of Ministers for this review power to be
activated. See ALB. CONST. art. 115, para. 2.
228 Under Article 9, certain political parties and organizations, such as those "based
on totalitarian methods" are prohibited. ALB. CONST. art. 9, para. 2. The Court
determines whether a group's program and activities fall within the provisions of Article
9, See ALB. CONST. art. 131 (e).
229 See ALB. CONST. art. 131(h); see also ALB. CONST. art. 152, para. I ("The
Constitutional Court reviews preliminarily the constitutionality of the issues put for a
referendum.").
230 ALa. CONST. art. 131(g); see also ALB. CONST. art. 70, para. 2 ("Deputies may
not simultaneously exercise any other public duty with the exception of that of a member
of the Council of Ministers."); ALB. CONST. art. 89 ("The President of the Republic may
not hold any other public duty, may not be a member of a party or carry out other private
activity.").
231 ALB. CONST. art. 90, para. 3. Under Article 90, the President "may be
discharged for serious violations of the Constitution and for the commission of a serious
crime." ALB. CONST. art. 90, para. 2. "A proposal for [I discharge of the President may
be made by not less than one-fourth of the members of the Assembly and must be
supported by not less than two-thirds of all its members." ALB. CONST. art. 90, para. 2.
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incapacitated that a new President must be elected.232  Under
Article 140, the decision of two-thirds of the members of the
Assembly to discharge a High Court judge also is subject to
review by the Constitutional Court.233
The final paragraph of Article 131 grants the Court authority to
adjudicate violations of individual rights. It provides that the
Constitutional Court decides on "final adjudication of the
individual complaints for the violation of their constitutional rights
to due process of law, after all legal means for the protection of
those rights have been exhausted.,
234
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the Constitution
gives the Court a very broad field of operation. However, that
domain is not infinite. For example, the Court cannot act on its
own motion.235 Indeed, this is a change from the provisional
constitutional framework (as expressed in the "Law on the Main
Constitutional Provisions") which existed between 1991 and
1998.236 Under that law, the Constitutional Court could "start[]
action on a complaint or on its own initiative. 2 37  As the Court
may not act on its own motion under the present Constitution, the
issue of standing becomes important.
b. Standing Before the Constitutional Court
The following actors have an unrestricted right to put the Court
232 ALB. CONST. art. 91, para. 2. Under Article 91, "if the President cannot exercise
his duties for more than 60 days, the Assembly by two-thirds of its members [may]
decide[] on sending the issue to the Constitutional Court," for a conclusive verification.
ALB. CONST. art. 91, para. 2.
233 See ALB. CONST. art. 140 ("The decision of the Assembly is reviewed by the
Constitutional Court, which, upon verification of the existence of one of [the specified
constitutional] grounds, declares his discharge from duty.").
234 ALB. CONST. art. 13 1(i).
235 See ALB. CONST. art. 134, para. 1 (noting that the Court may be put into motion
only on the request of a prescribed group of actors).
236 See Law on the Main Constitutional Provisions ch. liA, art. 25, available in
Constitutional Resource Home Page: Albania (visited Oct. 18, 1999)
<http://www.urich.edu/-jpjones/confinder/albcon.htm>; see also LUDWIKOWSKI, supra
note 54, at 145 (describing how the Constitutional Court functioned under the interim
Constitutional Provisions).
237 Law on the Main Constitutional Provisions ch. HIA, art. 25, available in
Constitutional Resource Home Page: Albania (visited Oct. 18, 1999)
<http://www.urich.edu/-jpjones/confinder/albcon.htm>.
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in motion: the President of the Republic;238 the Prime Minister;239
"not less than one-fifth of the deputies [of the Assembly] ;,2 40 and
the Chairman of High State Control.' Ordinary judges also have
242the power to raise constitutional questions. If a judge "finds that
a law comes into conflict with the Constitution," she is not
allowed to apply it.243 Rather, she must "suspend the proceedings
and send the issue to the Constitutional Court., 2 4 4 Thus, pursuant
to Article 145, paragraph 2, every court has standing before the
Constitutional Court.
245
Other constituencies are allowed to seek constitutional
interpretations from the Court as well, but only if their requests
concern "issues related with their interests., 246  Included in this
group are: the People's Advocate; 247  organs of the localgovernm nt;248orasor i u•° 24
government;21 organs of religious communities;2 9 political parties
and other organizations; 20 and individuals. 25'
4. Decision Making in the Court
The Court "decides with a majority of all its members. 252 Its
238 See ALB. CONST. art. 134, para. 1(a).
239 See ALB. CONST. art. 134, para. 1(b).
240 ALB. CONST. art. 134, para. 1 (c).
241 See ALB. CONST. art. 134, para. l(d). "The High State Control is the highest
institution of economic and financial control." ALB. CONST. art. 162, para. 1. It
supervises "the economic activity of state institutions and ... juridical persons" in which
the state owns more than fifty percent, and oversees "the use ... of state funds by the
organs of... government." See ALB. CONST. art. 163.
242 See ALB. CONST. art. 134, para. 1(e).
243 ALB. CONST. art. 145, para. 2.
244 id.
245 See ALB. CONST. art. 134, para. 1(e).
246 ALB. CONST. art. 134, para. 2.
247 See ALB. CONST. art. 134, para. l(f).
248 See ALB. CONST. art. 134, para. l(g); see also ALB. CONST. art. 115, para. 2
("The dissolved or discharged organ has the right to complain, within 15 days, to the
Constitutional Court, and in this case, the decision of the Council of Ministers is
suspended.").
249 See ALB. CONST. art. 134, para. 1(h).
250 See ALB. CONST. art. 134, para. I (i).
251 See ALB. CONST. art. 134, para. 1(0).
252 ALB. CONST. art. 133, para. 2.
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decisions "have general binding force and are final., 253  They
"enter in force the day of their publication in the Official Gazette,"
but the Court may provide that a "law or normative act is to be
invalidated on another date., 254 The Constitution provides that
"minority opinions are published together with the [majority]
decision.,
255
Article 132 provides that the Court "only has the right to
invalidate the acts it reviews.,,2" This provision is somewhat
ambiguous. It seems to deny the Court the power to invalidate
legislation that is not properly before it for review. That is, the
provision forbids the Court from escaping the prohibition against
acting on its own motion.257 Yet, the language is imprecise. The
word "acts" might be referring to the "normative acts of the
central and local organs" mentioned in Article 131(c). 258 If that
interpretation is correct, then could the Court invalidate laws (not
acts) that are not properly brought before it, i.e., laws about which
the opinion of the Court was not sought? If the provision was
truly intended to constrain the Court's review, the word "matter"
might have been a better choice than "act."
Several other aspects of the decision-making procedure raise
issues of interpretation as well. First, Article 133 provides that
"[a]cceptance of complaints for judgement is decided from a
number of judges as determined by law."25 9 The meaning of this
provision is not clear. Is it intended to make the Constitutional
Court a discretionary court like the United States Supreme Court?
Could the Court refuse to hear a case even though a clear
constitutional violation has occurred and the complaining party
has standing under Article 134? Does the provision apply to all
complaints for judgment, so that a request by the President to
review the constitutionality of a piece of legislation could be
253 ALB. CONST. art. 132, para. 1. Another article provides that these decisions are
binding on all courts. See ALB. CONST. art. 145, para. 2.
254 ALB. CONST. art. 132, para. 2.
255 Id.
256 ALB. CONST. art. 132, para. 1.
257 See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
258 ALB. CONST. art. 131(c) (The Constitutional Court decides on "compatibility of
normative acts of the central and local organs with the Constitution and international
agreements.").
259 ALB. CONST. art. 133, para. 1.
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rejected by the Court? Or is a better reading of this clause to say
that it does not extend to those actors who have unrestricted access
to the Court? Answers to these questions cannot be easily
discerned from the text of Article 133.
Another problem arises in interpreting Article 133, which
notes that the Court "decides with the majority of all its
members., 260  Does this mean that a majority of the Court's
members is required to form a quorum? That is, do five members
need to be present before the Court can even consider an issue?
Or do five judges have to concur in the decision before the Court
can resolve an issue? If the latter meaning was intended, what
happens when the judges split four to three to two? Since a
"majority of all the members" is five, can the Court in such a case
not reach a decision? Does the constitutional issue remain
unresolved? If the Court cannot decide, for example, whether a
proposed law violates the Constitution, does the legislation stand
or is it presumed to be unconstitutional? Again, the text fails to
answer these questions.
IV. Conclusion
Overall, the Albanian Constitution of 1998 is a masterful
fundamental charter. It is both firm, in providing specific
protection of certain fundamental human rights and freedoms, and
flexible, in allowing possibilities for future growth in this area. In
a new and ingenious way, it approaches a careful balance between
aspirations and economic practicalities. The institutional
framework the Constitution provides is sensitive to the need to
insulate judicial review from transitory populist pressures and to
the requirement that a constitution adequately protect democratic,
majoritarian values. The Constitution is largely successful in
providing a comprehensive outline of the rights of the individual
and of the structure and function of the Constitutional Court. Yet,
as with any document, ambiguities do exist. This Comment has
highlighted some of them; the task of resolving these difficult
questions remains with legal scholars and with the Constitutional
Court, as they address issues of constitutional interpretation in the
future.
EMIN S. TORO
260 ALB. CONST. art. 133, para. 2 (emphasis added).
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Appendix
Structure and Mandate of Albanian Constitutional Court
Composition and Recruitment
Number of members
Appointing authorities
Length of term
Age limit
Requisite qualifications
Constitutional Review Authority
A priori
A posteriori
Abstract review
Concrete review
Incidental
Direct
Effect of Decision
Inter partes
Erga omnes
Power to Refer Constitutional Controversies
Absolute power to refer
Power to refer for issues
related to their interests
President with consent of the
Assembly
9 years (3 judges replaced every
3 years)
70 years maximum
Lawyers with high qualification;
work experience not less than
15 years
Only for international
agreements
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
to the Court Possessed by:
President of Republic;
Prime Minister; not less than
1/5" of deputies; Chairman
of the High State Control;
every court (incidental only)
People's Advocate; local
government; religious
communities; political
parties; individuals
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